
























































































































































































This paper grew out of reflections after six years of collaboration within the research net-
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for continuous debate. Further, I thank Claus Bech Hansen, Anna Grieser, Dietrich Reetz and 
Conrad Schetter for their very helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
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What is an area? What is in an area? In recent discussions on area studies the limits and limi-
tations of “areas” have been hotly debated. The “geographies of knowing” produced by the 
conventional layout of studied areas go hand in hand with specific “geographies of igno-
rance”, writes Willem van Schendel (2002). As a result, he proposes a new area, “Zomia”, 
extending over the mountainous terrain from South East Asia via the margins of South Asia 
into Central Asia. Van Schendel proposed Zomia not so much to establish a new area but 
rather to point to the epistemological problems of any kind of fixed area in order to trigger 
the imagination of readers to think of other types of spatial formations that enable new 
kinds of insights. Knowledge simply “contained” in and by areas is always limited knowledge. 
The research network Crossroads Asia, funded by the initiative of the German Ministry for 
Education and Research (BMBF) to strengthen area studies in Germany, departed from this 
discussion and suggested not a new area (“Crossroads Asia”) but a new approach to area 
studies: a “Crossroads perspective” that focuses not on social and cultural processes con-
tained within certain spatial boundaries but rather on processes that cut across borders 
(Mielke and Hornidge 2014). In consequence, the members of the network were very critical 
of using any kind of “territorial container” as analytical device or unit of study. 
 
Yet last summer term I taught a course at my department that might be considered a cardi-
nal sin in the context of Crossroads Asia. The title of the course was Society and Culture of 
Pakistan. Thus, the title referred to a “territorial container” that limited the contents of the 
course to a country, to a (nation-)state and its territory. Why did I teach such a course? It is 
not because in a perspective of unacknowledged methodological nationalism I consider the 
nation-state as a “natural” container of culture and society, in the sense of setting limits to 
cultural and social processes and relationships. On the basis of cultural relationships it would 
perhaps make more sense to teach a course on some cross-border area like the Punjab, tak-
ing both the Pakistani West-Punjab and the Indian East-Punjab into account, or the high 
mountain area in the north of Pakistan, extending into the Afghan Wakhan corridor and the 
southern parts of Chinese Xinjiang. The nation-state is by no means a watertight container of 
culture and society but it has powerful effects: it binds very different social and cultural for-
mations together. The state forces, sometimes violently, different people with different ex-
periences and senses of belonging into a circumscribed space, and this has many and often 
grave effects on the state’s subjects. Often their only option is to either imagine some 
shared commonality, often far-fetched and with very little persuasion, or to fight against it. 
In its rejection of “container thinking”, emphasizing instead fluidity, mobility and the social 
construction of space, with its focus on the “meso” or “local” levels of society and out of the 
concern not to fall into the trap of another container in addition to the ”area”,1 the original 
proposal for Crossroads Asia gave little importance to the state. Yet, during the first phase of 
the network’s research we realized that “the state” is an important (f)actor to reckon with – 
not only because the state has a significant presence and importance in our interlocutors’ 
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  “Area” and “state” are of course not “containers” on an equal footing. In contrast to the state, which has a “life of 
its own”, because issues like power and sovereignty are intimately linked with it, the area is in most cases only a 




eyes and the social contexts we worked in, but also because the state strongly interfered 
with our research (see ‘Postscript’ in Crossroads Asia Working Group Conflict 2012/2014). 
 
In this paper, I will depart from a brief discussion of the failure of our project in the first 
phase of Crossroads Asia – a failure in the sense that we could not carry out the research 
initially planned because state intervention made crucial sites and people inaccessible. The 
role of the state and how it matters for “Crossroads Studies” is my main concern in this con-
tribution, for it raises a number of questions: What is “the state”, precisely? And how can we 
conceptualize the state within a “Crossroads perspective”? If we take the Crossroads per-
spective as emphasizing “the interdependence of multiple spatialities, such as places, scales, 
networks, distances, and mobilities” (Hornidge and Mielke 2015: 14), how does “the state” 
figure in? In this paper, I will draw mostly on anthropological discussions of conceptualiza-
tions of the state that do not take the state as it has conventionally been conceptualized, i.e. 
as an institution “out there”, based on rules and governing a fixed territory. Instead, I will 
draw on theoretical perspectives that consider “the state” as a construction that arises from 
discourses and everyday practices and that is unruly, fragmented and contradictory. I will 






Let me briefly narrate our initial research idea within the framework of Crossroads Asia that 
was thwarted by state interference. Crossroads Asia emphasized the significance of mobility 
in its dual sense, as physical mobility from place to place and as social mobility and mobiliza-
tion, from position to position. Crossroads Asia also gave much importance to Norbert Elias 
(2009) notion of figuration as a complex social formation centering on specific “issues” that 
links different actors and contexts (as well as materialities, Sökefeld 2015) and extends in 
time and space. From such a perspective we had intended to study movement(s) related to 
the planned construction of the Diamer-Bhasha dam, a “mega-project” on the river Indus in 
Pakistan’s high mountain area of Gilgit-Baltistan. More precisely, while the huge dam – if it is 
ever built – will be situated just on the border between Pakistan’s Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa 
province and Gilgit-Baltistan, the resultant lake will flood large parts of Gilgit-Baltistan’s Di-
amer district, reaching even beyond the town of Chilas. As in consequence of the Kashmir 
conflict Gilgit-Baltistan is a disputed area that is not a constitutional part of Pakistan, but 
“only” under Pakistan’s control (Sökefeld 2005), the construction of the dam affects issues of 
sovereignty, territoriality and political control. Although Gilgit-Baltistan is a very scantly pop-
ulated area given its high-mountain topography, people will be displaced by the lake.2 Thus, 
the dam will induce people’s physical movement. But there is also political mobilization for 
and against the dam: For the dam because of hopes for more regular supply of electricity, 
which is greatly needed, and for handsome compensations for the submerged land;3 and 
against the dam not only by local people threatened by displacement, but also by political 
activists out of larger political considerations, given Gilgit-Baltistan’s disputed status.4 As a 
consequence of highly remunerative compensations, social mobility was also at stake.5 Fur-
thermore, the materiality of the dam and the resultant lake will have massive consequences. 
Most importantly, the Karakorum Highway will be submerged over a length of 100 kilome-
ters6 and needs to be rebuilt in higher areas in order to maintain a year round road connec-
tion between Pakistan and Gilgit-Baltistan – another impact on movement. Planning re-
search we – that is Anna Grieser, the fieldworker, and myself – knew that the dam was a 
contentious issue in which many actors at local, regional, national and international levels 
had their stakes.7 We also knew that district Diamer was a difficult site for anthropological 
fieldwork. But still the issue of the dam seemed a perfect case for a Crossroads study based 
on a figurational approach. 
                       
2
  According to estimates, the construction of the dam requires the resettlement of more than 4000 families from 31 
villages (Terminski 2015: 98). 
3
  In particular the issue of compensation has mobilized residents; see Diamer-Bhasha project: Heftier payouts offered 
to residents displaced by dam, The Express Tribune, February 23, 2015, available online at: 
http://tribune.com.pk/story/842669/diamer-bhasha-project-heftier-payouts-offered-to-residents-displaced-by-
dam/ (accessed September 26, 2016). 
4
  See Protest rallies in Diamer against Bhasha dam, Dawn, February 2, 2006, available online at: 
http://www.dawn.com/news/176874/protest-rallies-in-diamer-against-bhasha-dam (accessed September 26, 2016). 
5
  In fact, physical movement and social mobility seem to go hand in hand as many people planned to invest their 
compensations in new houses in Pakistani cities like Mansehra and Abbottabad. 
6
  See Diamer-Bhasha Dam, International Rivers. Available online at: 
https://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/diamer-bhasha-dam (accessed September 26, 2016). 
7
  Initially, we planned to compare the Diamer-Bhasha Dam with the construction of the Mangla Dam which is similar-




Yet some of the stakeholders thought differently. For reasons that never became entirely 
clear, a bureaucrat in Gilgit-Baltistan’s home department in Gilgit strongly interfered with 
Anna Grieser’s planned fieldwork. He put intelligence agencies on her track in Chilas, the 
district capital, and got her yanked out of Diamer. It quickly became clear that research on 
the dam issue was impossible because of this sort of “state intervention” and Anna shifted 
her research interest to the much less controversial topic of Gilgit’s urban waterscape. But 
even there she suffered from constant interference and control by “the agencies” and offi-




Conceptualizing the state 
 
From the point of view of figurational sociology, the bureaucrats and agencies were part of 
the figuration of the dam which we were not allowed to study. Conventionally, departing, 
for instance, from Max Weber’s conceptualization of the state, agencies and bureaucrats 
would be seen simply as parts of the state, as actors representing the state. Yet more recent 
conceptualizations of the state strongly contradict Weber’s ideas, challenging his notion of a 
distinct, rational – and this largely means predictable – institution based on a consistent or-
der of law that pertains to a certain territory. According to the conventional model, the state 
as an autonomous body stands in clear contrast to those who are governed, i.e. who are 
forced to submit to its order which they regard as legitimate. Migdal and Schlichte (2005: 5) 
view the assumption of the autonomy of the state as the sine qua non of most political theo-
ries.8 As such a notion of the state is directly linked to a territory, Weber’s model of the state 
indeed can be considered a “container” model. Referring to India, Akhil Gupta (1995) in con-
trast has pointed out that the boundary between state and society is often blurred and that 
the state is not an a priori of everyday experiences. He argues instead that ideas of the state 
arise from low and local level practices and emphasizes the translocality of the state as a 
“space that is constituted by the intersection of local, regional, national, and transnational 
phenomena” (ibid, 392).9  
 
While Weber’s notion can be regarded as eurocentric, it is open to debate to what extent 
even Western states actually conform to his model (Hansen and Stepputat 2006). It is quite 
obvious, however, that Pakistan is a real misfit if we hold on to Weber’s definition of the 
state which, beside the territory, centers on the successful enforcement of the monopoly on 
the use of violence:10 The Pakistani state as conventionally conceived clearly does not suc-
cessfully claim such a monopoly, and its sovereignty is unevenly (to say the least) distributed 
over an equally heterogeneous territory that, beside the “regular”, constitutional territory of 
the state (in a way) comprises irregularities like the tribal areas on the Afghan border, Azad 
Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. Perhaps in most cases Max Weber’s conception refers more to 
normative fiction (or an ideal type, in Weber’s diction) than to a social and political reality. 
Already more than seven decades ago, anthropologist Radcliffe-Brown strongly voiced his 
objection against the “reality” of the state: 
 
„In writings on political institutions there is a good deal of discussion about the na-
ture and the origin of the State, which is usually represented as being an entity over 
and above the human individuals who make up a society, having as one of its attrib-
utes something called ‚sovereignty’, and sometimes spoken of as having a will (…) or 
                       
8
  Some authors, however, treated the autonomy of the state as a matter of degree and an empirical variable. See 
Skocpol 1985. 
9
  Later in this text I will argue on the basis of ethnographic evidence for a need to distinguish between state and 
government. But as state is the dominant term of analysis and as there is no consistent distinction of state and gov-
ernment in the theoretical literature, I will use state for the time being. 
10
  See Weber’s definition of the state in Economy and Society: “Staat soll ein politischer Anstaltsbetrieb heißen, wenn 
und insoweit sein Verwaltungsstab erfolgreich das Monopol legitimen physischen Zwanges für die Durchführung 
der Ordnungen in Anspruch nimmt“ (Weber 1972: 29). 
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as issuing commands. The state, in this sense, does not exist in the phenomenal 
world; it is a fiction of the philosophers. What does exist is an organization, i.e. a col-
lection of individual human beings connected by a complex system of relation. (…) 
There is no such thing as the power of the State; there are only, in reality, powers of 
individuals – kings, prime ministers, magistrates, policemen, party bosses, and voters” 
(Radcliffe-Brown 1940: xxiii). 
 
Reacting to this objection in his reflections on the “Difficulties of studying the state”, Philip 
Abrams (1988) suggested that we should give up the “The State” (capitalized) as a super-
imposed, unitary and bounded entity situated above society as an object of study and turn 
instead to the state-system11 and the state-idea.12 Abrams defines the state-system “a pal-
pable nexus of practice and institutional structure centered in government and more or less 
extensive, unified and dominant in any given society”, while the state-idea is a misrepresen-
tation that does the ideological work of disguising the disunity of state institutions and prac-
tices.13 The state-idea thus serves as a hegemonic idea that masks actual power relations 
and produces the belief in the legitimacy of the state system. Pointing, like Gupta, to the fact 
that, at the empirical level state, society and economy – the trinity of the modern social 
world – are deeply intertwined and cannot be separated, Timothy Mitchell (2006) argues 
that their apparent separation is produced through techniques of spatial and temporal or-
dering to which individuals are subjected and through which the appearance and idea of the 
state as an “apparatus,” as an autonomous actor external to society, is produced. Among 
other things, Mitchell points to the technique of bordering that produces this “state effect”: 
By establishing a territorial boundary to enclose a population and exercising absolute control 
over movement across it, governmental powers define and help constitute a national entity: 
“Setting up and policing a frontier involves a variety of fairly modern social practices – con-
tinuous barbed-wire fencing, passports, immigration laws, inspections, currency control, and 
so on. These mundane arrangements (…) help manufacture an almost transcendental entity, 
the nation-state” (Mitchell 2006: 180). Emphasizing that this transcendental entity goes be-
yond conscious and rational conceptualization to include affects and non-rational psychic 
states, Navarro-Yashin (2002: 4f.) writes about the fantasies of the state. 
 
These interventions strongly speak against the simple equation of the state with a container 
conceived in spatial terms: Speaking with Mitchell, we can say that the idea of the (territorial) 
container, produced, among other things, by bordering practices and related discourses, is a 
significant element of the state-idea that, however, masks actual relationships that often cut 
across borders. Yet while the analytical distinction of state-idea and state-system is helpful, 
we certainly should not give up studying the state-idea in favor of studying only the state-
system, as Abrams suggested. 
                       
11
  Abrams’ conceptualization does not imply that the state-system is necessarily systematic. His choice of the term is 
probably due to the prevalence of systems-theory at the time of his writing (1977), although Abrams was no adher-
ent of systems theory. In his opinion, systems theory does not explain the state but “explains it away” (Abrams 1988: 
85, endnote 18). 
12
  Without acknowledging Abrams’ conceptualization, this was later paralleled by Migdal and Schlichte’s (2005) dis-
tinction of seeing the state and doing the state. 
13
  Given our everyday experiences of the disunity of the state the belief in its unitary character is indeed “most striking” 




A figurative approach towards the state 
 
I suppose that I do not have to argue here for the importance of the state (both idea and 
system) for the social worlds that we study. Even if in the conflict section of the Crossroads 
Asia network we did originally not focus on the state as primary actor of disputes, the signifi-
cance of “the state” at multiple levels of conflict could not be overlooked. If we briefly return 
to our initial project, there was “the state” in the shape of the bureaucrat who stopped Anna 
Grieser’s progress to Diamer and of “the agencies” that subsequently monitored her steps. 
But of course “the state” was not only impinging on the researcher; it was part of the scene, 
the issue we intended to study: “the state” took steps towards building the dam, negotiating 
its funding in the international arena and land compensations with the local people, and so 
on. Even after Anna Grieser had shifted her research focus from the massive “mega project” 
of the Diamer-Bhasha Dam to more mundane forms of using and regulating water resources 
in Gilgit’s urban area, she had to confront the state not only embodied in the agencies that 
attempted to monitor all her research activities (Grieser 2014, 2016a), but of course also in 
the shape of the local administration of water, of officers and line men, quite comparable to 
the local-level “encounters with the state” that are emphasized by Akhil Gupta. Interestingly, 
“the state” (the agencies) again tried to rigorously restrict her encounters with “the state” 
(i.e. with various sections of the local administration). 
 
In line with the overall conceptual approach of the Crossroads network, I suggest a figurative 
approach to the state. To be sure, I do not mean to suggest simply conceiving of the state as 
a figuration. In Norbert Elias’ conceptualization, a figuration does not start from ‘entities’ but 
from issues, like that of playing cards or football, or the issue of a conflict. A figuration is not 
an essentialization of “the game” but the particular and concrete act of playing a game by 
specific actors in a specific context; it is a process linking together action and structural con-
ditions. The state in itself is not an issue (if we leave aside the theoretical issue of its concep-
tualization) but it is part of many issues. The most general issue is the issue of government 
understood in the Foucauldian sense, which aims not only at safeguarding or reproducing 
sovereignty, but also at the “care” for a population. 14 In a way, the shift that Foucault ob-
served in the execution of power since the 17th century prefigures the dissolution of the 
unity of the state and the blurring of the boundary between state and society.15 The sover-
eign is no longer external to the society over which he exerts power but becomes part of it 
(Foucault 2005). In Elias’ terms we can say that state and society have to be conceptualized 
as being part of the same figuration.16 Government in this sense entails the multiplication of 
its instruments, strategies and purposes. In fact, governmentality is almost ever-extending, 
                       
14
  This certainly does not mean that the population is necessarily well cared for. But government still has to be ex-
plained and legitimized in terms of the public good (or the “national interest”, though Foucault did not write much 
about the significance of the “nation” in this context) and not simply in terms of its own perpetuation. 
15
  „But the state, no more probably today than at any other time in its history, does not have this unity, this individual-
ity, this rigorous functionality, not, to speak frankly, this importance; maybe, after all, the state is no more than a 
composite reality and a mythicized abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think. May-
be what is really important for our modernity – that is, for our present – is not so much the étatisation of society, as 
the ‘governmentalization’ of the state” (Foucault 1991: 103). 
16
  On Elias’ figuration concept and the state see also Kuhlmann 2000. 
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addressing issues that have not previously been within the purview of government.17 Thus, 
there is not one issue of government but a multitude of issues like water, health, education, 
transport, security and the like, that partly overlap and interlink, but that may also contra-
dict one another because they are not taken care of by one single homogeneous and united 
actor. Further, the multiplication of the instruments and purposes of government result in a 
spill-over effect, beyond state institutions, blurring the boundary between state and society. 
Indeed the very fact that governing is not done by the state institutions alone, but also by 
non-state actors like “non-governmental organizations” obscures the boundaries further.18  
                       
17
  Elsewhere I have for instance referred to the extension of government into the realm of “natural” disasters which 
earlier had been simply a matter of God and fate (Sökefeld 2012-13). 
18
  From a Foucauldian perspective, the term „NGO“ is a real misnomer as such organizations are in fact part of pro-
cesses of governing. In Gilgit-Baltistan, the organizations of the Aga Khan Development Network, that in some areas 
in a way duplicate state administration in fields like health and education, are particularly important non-state 




State and government 
 
In the foregoing, I have shown how we detect a blurring of state and society on the analyti-
cal, theoretical level. Let us now contrast this with the empirical level. For from the emic 
perspective, i.e. from the point of view of citizens, the concept of state appears quite effec-
tive: people indeed often perceive “the state” as an apparatus that is distinct from or op-
posed to society (Obeid 2010: 337). Akhil Gupta writes that people in rural India encounter 
the state in their everyday relationships with government bureaucracies. But do they? Do 
people equate (or confuse) in a rather Weberian sense the bureaucrat with the state? How 
do they speak about the state? Interestingly, Gupta opens his article with an example where 
he writes that his village people habitually talk about “corruption” and “the state”, giving the 
vernacular term for corruption but not for the state (Gupta 1995: 375). How do people in his 
village talk about and refer to the state? In my reading it seems that Gupta mostly mixes 
state and government (e.g. ibid. 390).19  
 
Among the citizens in Pakistan, there is surprisingly little everyday talk about the state. In 
Gilgit-Baltistan, the English word “state” or its Urdu equivalent (riyāsat) are rarely used. In 
contrast, people talk all the time about the “government” (hukumat, less frequently: sark
ār) taken in the conventional, non-Foucauldian sense. In fact, quotidian institutions are at-
tributed to the government and not to the state. In Pakistan and in Gilgit-Baltistan there are 
government high schools or hospitals, for instance, but neither state schools nor state hospi-
tals. Local discourse is quite specific. Thus, local, sympathetic commentators attributed Anna 
Grieser’s difficulties not to the state but to the government, or, more specifically, to particu-
lar persons in the administration and agencies.  
 
Grieser’s experiences reveal that there are different usages of “government”: Often it is used 
inclusively, referring to both elected incumbents like the Chief Minister, the Members of the 
Legislative Assembly and to non-elected officials, while it is sometimes also used to refer 
only to the elected government. In either case, government refers to those institutions that 
have a practical impact on people’s lives, which can, at least in principle, be approached or 
encountered by the people, just like a government school. Tellingly, people routinely com-
plain about the government, the agencies, the administration or specific officers, i.e. about 
the innumerable elements of the state-system, but they rarely complain about “the state” 
(i.e. “Pakistan”).20 In Pakistan “the State” indeed appears as Mitchell’s transcendental entity 
mentioned above, i.e. one that is far removed from the neglect of services and the grave 
deficiencies of everyday life. In Gilgit-Baltistan, a region which, due to its disputed status 
derived from the Kashmir conflict, suffers from a number of political disabilities, the huge 
contrast between the daily shortcomings of the “state-system” and celebratory invocations 
                       
19
  At one point Gupta recognizes that his interlocutor distinguishes „the regime and the bureaucracy” (1995: 391), but 
this is not reflected in his analysis. 
20
 I am referring here to everyday discourse, not to more specific political discourse like that of nationalists in Gilgit-
Baltistan who reject Pakistan’s control of the area and therefore also complain about “the state” (Sökefeld 1999). 
Concerning everyday discourse, I have to admit that this has changed to some extent in recent years. When people 
complain about a particular shortcoming that is attributed to the government, they often close by exclaiming with a 
sigh: “This is Pakistan!” This, however, is not specific to Gilgit-Baltistan but can be heard in Pakistan as well. 
State and government 
10 
 
of “the state”, for instance in the festivities on Pakistan’s independence day on the 14th of 
August, or other national holidays, is particularly striking. Here it becomes clear that the 
state-idea is closely linked to the idea of the nation which on such occasions is celebrated 
through its symbols and heroes. People are proud of their state and their nation but, with 
the exception of enthusiastic party soldiers, not at all of their government. 
 
Tentatively we could say that by distinguishing government and state, people in Gilgit-
Baltistan distinguish the state-system from the state-idea. This is of course not an unequivo-
cal and clear-cut distinction that is neatly congruent with Abrams’ theoretical distinction, but 
it helps to realize that both aspects matter in local perspective. 
 
Bringing Foucault in again, we have to realize that in Pakistan, caring benevolence is at-
tributed to and expected from the state, not from the government. Thus, Foucault’s termi-
nology is a bit confusing here. In Pakistan, the state-idea is intimately linked to the idea of 
“goodness”; the state-idea has strong paternalistic aspects: The state needs to be honored 
like one’s father and at least in principle one should be ready to sacrifice oneself for it. Gov-
ernment, in contrast, is seen from the emic point of view as the body which almost always 
fails to fulfil the expectations put into the idea of the state.21 Honor and respect for the gov-
ernment are rare. 
 
If we take issues of governing (rather than government) as figurations, we realize that we 
first have to take the state-system, or elements of it, into account. Thus, in analyzing the 
figuration of urban water supply, Anna Grieser had to deal with different governmental de-
partments like the Public Works Department, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or 
the Water and Sanitation Department (WASA), which do not neatly melt into one body of 
“government”. In fact, practices and goals of EPA and WASA may at times be quite contra-
dictory. Also individual officers cannot be simply equated with their department. Some of 
them are related to residents in a particular part of the town who, on the basis of kinship, 
may expect and even demand preferential treatment in terms of water supply which cannot 
be refused. This is another level of blurring and entanglement of “state” and “society”, 
which the label “corruption” would capture only very inadequately. Thus, we are confronted 
with a highly complex figuration of different actors and concerns that are multiply interwo-
ven and that form a very specific “waterscape” (Grieser 2016b). Yet, apart from the different 
departments and their personnel as part of the state-system, the state-idea may also play a 
role when, on the basis of promises that the state cares for their needs, people take the 
government to task. Thus, while the state-idea may on one hand work as a cover to mask 
relations of subordination and even exploitation, it may also serve as a basis to raise de-
mands and voice protest against government. In any case, not only elements of the state-
system are part of a figuration, but also the state-idea with the values, symbols, ideologies 
and expectations that are linked to it. 
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Don’t reduce the state to a container 
 
In Gilgit-Baltistan, the state-idea as container is very important. Being disputed between 
India and Pakistan, Gilgit-Baltistan is not a regular (“constitutional”) section of Pakistan’s 
territorial container. Yet in spite of almost seventy years of deferment, most people in Gilgit-
Baltistan still demand and long for the full accession of the region to Pakistan although this 
would most probably not bring much improvement in terms of the services of Pakistan’s 
state-system – Pakistan consists of parts with constitutional rights that are even more ne-
glected than Gilgit-Baltistan. The wish for full accession is to a large extent an issue of identi-
ty and recognition, that is to say, it is an issue of identification with Pakistan’s state-idea. On 
the other hand, beyond the state-idea the container does not always matter much, the “con-
tainer” is by no means watertight and sacrosanct as long as the idea is not challenged. Fol-
lowing political considerations, actors of the state-system/ government may variously open 
or close the container. A current case in point is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a 
huge network of Chinese investments in Pakistan that will bind Pakistan much closer to its 
north-eastern neighbor and give China even greater influence on politics and economy in 
Pakistan. In this context, the political status of Gilgit-Baltistan has again become a heated 
topic potentially leading to a reform of Gilgit-Baltistan’s status, which would aim to legally 
and politically protect Chinese investments in the area (Sökefeld, forthcoming). Thus, the 
government will perhaps change the political status of Gilgit-Baltistan not in response to the 
longstanding demands of the citizens of Gilgit-Baltistan, but in response to the requirements 
of Chinese economic and political interests.22 The container leaks in terms of sovereignty 
that is partly outsourced (Hansen and Stepputat 2006) beyond its territory, to China. 
 
With his emphasis on governmentality, biopolitics and the capillary dispersal of power 
throughout society, Foucault almost pushed the question of sovereignty out of political the-
ory. But sovereignty returned in particular with the writings of Giorgio Agamben (1998, 2005) 
who insists on the primacy of legal-institutional power. With his concept, derived from Carl 
Schmitt, of the sovereign as ‘the one who decides on the state of exception’, he contends 
that “sovereign violence (…) has not disappeared with the emergence of modern biopolitical 
governance” (Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 17). Yet with this very abstract and centralistic 
conception, Agamben cannot reach into the intricacies and the ethnography of fragmented 
political life. What is more, sovereignty is often dispersed and needs to be approached in a 
more differentiated way. Accordingly, Humphrey speaks of “localized forms of sovereignty” 
(2007: 420) and Hansen and Stepputat regard sovereignty of the state as an “aspiration that 
seeks to create itself in the face of internally fragmented, unevenly distributed and unpre-
dictable configurations of political authority that exercise more or less legitimate violence on 
a territory” (2005: 3). For Pakistan, the spatial extension of sovereignty conceived in these 
terms, i.e. as “more or less legitimate violence”, certainly does not match the territory in a 
neat, Weberian congruency. There are diverse contenders of the sovereignty and legitimacy 
of the Pakistani government on its territory. Beside Chinese encroachments, think also about 
                       
22
  “Chinese pressure sees Pakistan mull constitutional status of Gilgit-Baltistan”, The Express Tribune, January 7, 2016. 
Online at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/1023523/chinese-pressure-sees-pakistan-mull-constitutional-status-of-gilgit-
baltistan/ (accessed September 20, 2016). 
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Baluch separatists, Taliban who dispute the Pakistani government’s legitimacy in religious 
terms, or the drone strikes of the US government that challenge Pakistan’s ability or willing-
ness to eradicate terrorism on its own territory – that is, the state’s ability to enforce a mo-
nopoly on the use of violence. In addition, the Durand Line, which separates Pakistan from 
Afghanistan shows that Pakistan’s territorial borders are not everywhere as tight as they 
ideally should be according to conventional models of the state (Schetter 2013). In terms of 
sovereignty, then, Pakistan, as a container, is heavily perforated.23  
 
Yet still, the activists against the construction of the Diamer-Bhasha Dam give much im-
portance to the container idea and would like to seal the container. They are mostly Gilgit-
Baltistan nationalists who hold the opinion that Pakistan has no legitimate powers within 
Gilgit-Baltistan as the area is not part of Pakistan’s constitutional-territorial container (see 
Sökefeld 2005). They accuse Pakistan of violating the container’s borders by planning to 
build a dam that would mostly affect a territory that lies beyond. Again, by building the dam, 
the container would be punctured by the state-system. 
 
It becomes clear, then, that we should not squarely equate the state with a container. While 
the container may be an important element of the state-idea, the walls and borders of the 
container are often negotiated and made penetrable by the state-system – in addition to 
cultural flows that, even by walled state-borders, can never be contained. The importance 
given to the container idea may be subjected to the mundane interests of power as played 
out within the entanglements of the state-system. We may come to the conclusion that the 
container idea is an important element of Timothy Mitchell’s state effect that masks actual 
leakages, which are opened in the interest of power and economic gain. It may also be an 
instrument used in power struggles; an instrument employed particularly to claim or to dis-
miss claims of legitimacy. Using a thus informed concept of the state in our analysis, we do 
not fall into the trap of “container thinking”. 
                       
23
  In order to counter the widespread but simplified image that Pakistan’s sovereignty is punctured only from the 
outside, by other powers encroaching on its territory, I should remark in parenthesis that the government of Paki-
stan also tries to extend a kind of sovereignty beyond its own territorial borders, keeping tabs on its citizens that 
live elsewhere, for instance by offering them a form of belonging beyond formal citizenship. Emigrants from Paki-
stan that have naturalized in their country of residence are offered the status of “Former Citizen of Pakistan” that 
confers them certain rights like the permission to buy property in Pakistan which plain foreigners do not enjoy (see 
https://www.nadra.gov.pk/index.php/products/cards/poc, accessed October 31, 2016). With such a policy, Pakistan, 






From a figurational “Crossroads perspective”, we should conceptualize the state neither as a 
singular actor, a body distinct and opposed to or above society (Ferguson and Gupta 2002), 
nor as a container that confines a society and neatly demarcates and separates it from other 
societies that are conceptualized spatially as its “neighbors”. While in political discourse the 
state is no doubt often invoked as such - as an entity above society linked to a clearly demar-
cated container-territory - we cannot be content with pinpointing only to such a state-idea. 
In our analysis we have to come to terms with the actual, empirical manifestations of both 
idea and system in political discourse and practice. Yet, for a figurational approach to the 
state, the precise analysis of the invocation of the territorial state-idea, its contents and con-
text, both by actors of the state-system and by opposed (“non-state”) actors, may be of par-
ticular importance. Analyzing how such a state-idea is conjured up either to disguise rela-
tions of domination or to lay bare entanglements of power and interests is an important 
step for the understanding of political figurations. The cultural form of the state is an empiri-
cal phenomenon, Timothy Mitchell (1991: 81) emphasized. Thus, I think, we can continue to 
teach, now and then, courses like the one on Pakistan that I taught last semester. We must 
convey the message, however, that while the container idea of the state - often forcefully 
employed to tie people together - may be very powerful, the “container system” is very 
leaky. Moreover, specific flipsides of ignorance are inherent to our “geographies of knowing”, 
and only by acknowledging these can we further push the boundaries of knowledge and ar-
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